It is often claimed that, because of semantic underdetermination, one can determine the content of an utterance only by appealing to pragmatic considerations concerning what
desires; hypotheses in virtue of which it can be deemed rational for the agent to behave as she does.
• Pragmatic interpretation is defeasible. The best explanation we can offer for an action given the available evidence can always be overriden if enough new evidence is adduced to account for the subject's behaviour.
• There is no limit to the amount of contextual information that can in principle affect pragmatic interpretation. Any piece of information can turn out to be relevant and influence the outcome of pragmatic interpretation.
A particular class of human actions is that of communicative actions. That class is defined by the fact that the intention underlying the action is a communicative intention -an intention such that (arguably) its recognition by the addressee is a necessary and perhaps sufficient condition for its fulfilment. To communicate that p is therefore to act in such a way that the addressee will explain one's action by ascribing to the agent the intention to communicate that p. For communication to succeed, the addressee must not only understand that the agent does what he does in order to communicate something to her; she must also understand what the agent tries to communicate. To secure that effect the communicator will do something which will evoke in the adressee's mind that which he wants to communicate. To that purpose the communicator may use icons, or indices, or symbols, that is, conventional signs. It is, of course, symbols that are used when the communicator and the addressee share a common language.
At this point semantic interpretation and pragmatic interpretation make contact with each other. A speech act is an action performed by uttering a sentence in some language L. Let us assume that the sentence has a certain semantic interpretation in L: it means that p. Since the speaker utters a sentence which means that p and manifests the intention to communicate something to the hearer, one reasonable hypothesis is that he intends to communicate that p. If that is the best explanation for the action given the available evidence, the hearer will settle for it and (if that was indeed the speaker's intention) the communicative intention will be fulfilled: the speaker will have succeeded in communicating that p to the hearer. In this case the speech act will be assigned a particular content as a result of pragmatic interpretation; and that content will coincide with the content which comes to be assigned to the sentence as a result of semantic interpretation. That is not really a coincidence, of course; for the semantic interpretation of the sentence was part of the evidence used in pragmatically determining the content of the speech act. But there are cases in which the two contents 1 But once it is determined that the utterance at issue counts as an utterance of a particular sentence of L, semantic interpretation takes over, and the content of that sentence is mechanically determined.-On the other hand what the speaker means is determined by pragmatic interpretation. It relies on a general assessment of the speaker's beliefs and desires, given an overall assumption of rationality. As I pointed out any piece of contextual information may turn out to be relevant to establishing the correct interpretation for the speech act.
Inferentialism vs. Anti-Inferentialism
There is a good deal of truth in the standard picture. In particular, the distinction between the two types of interpretation and the idea that both play a role in linguistic communication is important. There is also something deeply wrong with that picture, as we shall see : it ignores the phenomenon of semantic underdetermination (section 3).
Before criticizing the standard picture, however, I would like to introduce a debate between two positions, or two attitudes, with respect to linguistic communication construed as involving the two types of interpretation. The debate can be stated in terms of the standard picture, and that's what I am about to do; but it can also be stated in terms of the more refined view we will arrive at after the standard picture has been duly criticized. (My aim in this paper is precisely to show that the debate in question survives the refinement of the standard picture made necessary by the phenomenon of semantic underdetermination.)
The two positions in the debate I call 'inferentialism' and 'anti-inferentialism':
• (Millikan 1984: 67) .
2 2 For a similar position, see Burge (1993) and McDowell (1980 McDowell ( , 1993 . As they both point out, the knowledge gained when one is told that p in a normal communication situation is no more justified by an inference from the reliability of the source than the knowledge gained through perception is justified by an inference from the reliability of our senses. The reliability of our senses, or the reliability of our informants, is a background condition, just as the proper functioning of memory is a background condition for making long deductions. The proper functioning of memory is not one of the premisses in the deduction, however, and similarly, the reliability of our senses, or the reliability of our informants, is a background condition for the perceptual or communicational acquisition of knowledge, rather than a premiss in a knowledge-providing inference. Even if we restrict our attention to expressions traditionally classified as indexicals, we see that they involve a good deal of semantic underdetermination. This is true, in particular, of demonstratives. The reference of a demonstrative cannot be determined by a rule, like the rule that 'I' refers to the speaker. It is generally assumed that there is such a rule, namely the rule that the demonstrative refers to the object which happens to be demonstrated or which happens to be the most salient, in the context at hand. But the notions of 'demonstration' and 'salience' are pragmatic notions in disguise. They cannot be cashed out in terms merely of the narrow context.
Ultimately, a demonstrative refers to what the speaker who uses it refers to by using it.
To be sure, one can make that into a semantic rule. One can say that the character of a demonstrative is the rule that it refers to what the speaker intends to refer to. As a result, one will add to the narrow context a sequence of 'speaker's intended referents', in such a way that the n th demonstrative in the sentence will refer to the n th member of the sequence. Formally that is fine, but philosophically it is clear that one is cheating. We pretend that we can manage with a limited, narrow notion of context of the sort we need for handling indexicals, while in fact we can only determine the speaker's intended referent (hence the semantic referent, which depends upon the speaker's intended referent) by resorting to pragmatic interpretation and relying on the wide context.
We encounter the same sort of problem even with expressions like 'here' and 'now' which are traditionally considered as pure indexicals (rather than demonstratives).
Their semantic value is the time or place of the context respectively. But what counts as the time and place of the context? How inclusive must the time or place in question be?
It depends on what the speaker means, hence, again, on the wide context. As is wellknown, 'here' can refer to this room, this building, this city, this country, etc., and the same underdetermination affects 'now'. We can maintain that the character of 'here' and 'now' is the rule that the expression refers to 'the' time or 'the' place of the context -a rule which automatically determines a content, given a (narrow) context in which the time and place parameters are given specific values; but then we have to let a pragmatic process take place to fix the values in question, that is, to determine which narrow context, among indefinitely many candidates compatible with the facts of the utterance, serves as argument to the character function. On the resulting view the (narrow) context with respect to which an utterance is interpreted is not given, it is not determined automatically by objective facts like where and when the utterance takes place, but it is determined by the speaker's intention and the wide context. Again, we reach the conclusion that pragmatic interpretation has a role to play in determining the content of the utterance, in such a case.
To sum up, either semantic interpretation delivers something gappy, and pragmatic interpretation must fill the gaps until we reach a complete proposition ; or we run semantic interpretation only after we have used pragmatic interpretation to pre- There are psychological processes in us that take us from the meaning of the sentence to the content of the utterance (corresponding to the speaker's intent). Those symptoms that the other is tinkering with these mechanisms, and can rise above these automatic mechanisms if necessary' (Millikan, 1984: 69) . is correct, they generally offer something that looks like a truncated logical argument: the speaker must have intended this interpretation rather than that, because this is the only interpretation that is true; or the only one that gives the to another which is the consequence of it. Accordingly, our judgments are distinguished into intuitive, which are not grounded upon any preceding judgment, and discursive, which are deduced from some preceding judgment by reasoning' (Reid, 1969: 710) .
Evidently, comprehension is intuitive rather than discursive, except in the special situations in which one adopts a reflective stance towards the ongoing discourse.
Normally we do not have to reason to understand what the others are saying: the judgment that the speaker has said that p is made directly upon hearing the utterance, without being inferentially grounded in some prior judgment to the effect that the speaker has uttered sentence S. But the inferentialists do not deny that comprehension is intuitive rather than discursive. When they say that communication is inferential, they mean it in a sense which is compatible with its being intuitive. According to them, there are two sorts of inference (or two sorts of 'reasoning'). One is conscious, explicit inference -what Reid calls 'reasoning'. Let us call that 'inference in the narrow sense'.
But there is also inference in the broad sense: a type of inference which may well occur unconsciously, in such a way that the judging subject is aware only of the conclusion of the inference (which is, therefore, available not as the conclusion of an inference but as an immediate, intuitive judgment).
The inferentialist admits, indeed emphasizes, that the inferential procedure underlying ordinary understanding is unconscious. In special cases the inference is made explicit at a reflective level; but inference is there all the time, they maintain, whether or not it is available to consciousness. As Sperber says, 'when most of us talk of reasoning, we think of an occasional, conscious, difficult, and rather slow mental activity. What modern psychology has shown is that something like reasoning goes on all the time -unconsciously, painlessly, and fast.' (Sperber, 1995: 195) It is in that modern psychological sense that communication is said to be 'inferential'.
That there is such a broad notion of inference in contemporary cognitive science is beyond question. For example, Marr writes that 'the true heart of visual perception is the inference from the structure of an image about the structure of the real world outside' (Marr 1982: 68) . Insofar as this is the notion of inference appealed to by the inferentialists, the debate turns out to be verbal. Burge himself, in the first sentence of the passage I have quoted, grants that unconscious, sub-personal 'inferences' may well take place in the process of understanding. He writes : 'We seem normally to understand content in a way whose unconscious details (inferential or otherwise) are not accessible via ordinary reflection.' (Burge, 1993 : 477 ; italics mine.) This is compatible with communication's not being inferential in the narrow sense -a sense that requires conscious accessibility.
In view of the existence of the two senses, it is misleading to argue against the anti-inferentialist position, which says that communication is not inferential in the narrow sense, on the grounds that communication is inferential in the broad sense. But
-if I read her correctly -that is what Anne Bezuidenhout does in her critique of
Burge (Bezuidenhout 1998) . Burge (1993) distinguishes preservative processes like memory and justificatory processes like inference (in the narrow sense). 5 He claims that 'in interlocution, perception of utterances makes possible the passage of propositional content from one mind to another rather as purely preservative memory makes possible the preservation of propositional content from one time to another' (Burge, 1993: 481) . The cognitive processes underlying comprehension are therefore preservative rather than justificatory. Bezuidenhout's argument against Burge has the following form:
(i) Burge grants that 'inferential processes do play a role in justification' (Bezuidenhout, 1998: 269) .
(ii) But, as Sperber and Wilson and others have shown, the cognitive processes underlying communication are inferential.
(iii) It follows that Burge is wrong: 'the underlying processes do play a justificatory role. This is because the underlying processes are essentially inferential, and it has already been established... that inferential processes play a justificatory role.' (Bezuidenhout, 1998: 270) That argument, it seems to me, trades on a confusion between the two senses of 'inference'. Burge grants that inference is justificatory only to the extent that 'inference' is understood in the narrow sense. But in (ii), 'inference' had better be taken in the broad sense (since the inferentialist position defended by Bezuidenhout would be indefensible if 'inference' were taken in the narrow sense).
Spontaneous Inference and the Availability Condition
What I call inference in the narrow sense corresponds to Reid's description of 'reasoning' understood as a conscious activity. I claim that, in communication, such inferences take place in special cases. My distinction between primary and secondary pragmatic processes rests on the fact that the latter are, while the former are not, inferential in that narrow sense. But the notion of conscious inference that is relevant here does not quite correspond to Sperber's description. Sperber contrasts explicit, conscious reasoning, which is a voluntary, effortful and slow activity, with spontanous inference, which is effortless, fast, and takes place unconsciously. That distinction I find misleading in the present context. Like Sperber, I think that inference in the narrow sense is essentially conscious: it takes place only if one judgment (the conclusion) is grounded in another judgment (the premise), and if both judgments, as well as the fact that one is grounded in and justified by the other, are available (consciously accessible)
to the judging subject. Secondary pragmatic processes are inferential in the narrow sense because they satisfy that essential condition -the availability condition. But it would be wrong to claim that narrow inferences are necessarily effortful, slow and under voluntary control. Among inferences in the narrow sense, some -including those that underly the retrieval of conversational implicatures -are typically spontaneous: the inference is drawn more or less automatically.
Consider Sperber's following examples of spontanous inference: you hear the doorbell ringing, and you form the belief 'There is someone at the door' (Sperber, 1997: 77-78) . That belief is inferentially derived from a prior belief (to the effect that the doorbell is ringing) directly based on perception . 'If challenged, you might be able to produce, ex post facto, a missing premise that, together with the perceptual belief, warrants the inferential belief. However, the fact is that you arrived at the inferential belief without engaging in deliberate or conscious inference' (Sperber, 1997: 78) . But in all the cases of spontaneous inference mentioned by Sperber in the passage from which I've just quoted, including the doorbell example, the availability condition is satisfied: the subject makes two judgments, one based on perception, the other based on inference from the first belief. The two judgments are conscious and available to the subject. Moreover, the subject is aware that the second judgment is grounded in, and justified by, the first. If she says, 'There is someone at the door', and is asked 'How do you know?', she will reply something like: 'The doorbell is ringing'. The perceptual judgment to the effect that the doorbell is ringing justifies, and is known to justify, the nonperceptual judgment that there is someone at the door. Since there are two judgments standing in the appropriate relation to each other, Reid's definition of 'reasoning' applies, even though this piece of reasoning is spontaneous, effortless and fast. The only thing that is not conscious here are the inferential steps needed to bridge the gap between the first, perceptual belief and the second, inferential belief. Still, the inference, though not explicit, is conscious in the sense that the availability condition is satisfied. This is in contrast to cases in which the availability condition is not satisfied:
cases, for example, where the subject is aware only of one judgment, the alleged inferential source of that judgment being unavailable to consciousness; or cases in which both judgments are available, but the subject is unaware of one being inferentially derived from the other.
I conclude that there are two sorts of inference in the narrow sense : explicit reasoning, and spontaneous inference. In both cases the availability condition is satisfied. Inferences in the broad sense are characterized by the fact that the availability condition is not satisfied. Now it is my contention that, if primary pragmatic processes are indeed inferential, they are inferential only in the broad sense. The interpreter is not aware that his judgment, to the effect that the speaker has said that p, is inferentially derived from a prior judgment (e.g. a judgment to the effect that the speaker has uttered sentence S). Similarly, some theorists claim that perceptual judgments themselves are inferential, but the inferences at issue do not satisfy the availability condition: the perceiver is not aware that his perceptual judgment that p is based on a prior judgment (to the effect that things seem thus and so, or whatever).
If the subject says 'The doorbell is ringing' and is asked 'How do you know?', she will reply: 'I can hear it'. That reply merely indicates the perceptual nature of the current judgment 'The doorbell is ringing'; it does not reveal a prior judgment on which it is based. The current judgment is not based on another judgment, as in reasoning, it is directly based on perception and is therefore justified qua perceptual judgment, without any need for a grounding premiss justified unless there are reasons to disbelieve the testimony of my senses. This is not to deny that, perhaps, an inference is involved in forming the perceptual or the communicational judgment. But that inference, if it takes place, does not satisfy the availability condition: it is not an inference for the subject, and it plays no justificatory role in her mental life.
An Intermediate Sort of Inference ?
Since there are (at least) two senses of 'inference', the inferentialist/anti-inferentialist debate turns out to be verbal to a large extent. The anti-inferentialist does not deny that communication, or even perception for that matter, may be inferential in the broad sense; nor does the inferentialist deny that communication, like perception, is noninferential in the narrow sense. Still, I think there is room for genuine disagreement, on several counts.
First, the anti-inferentialist emphasizes the difference between inference in the narrow sense (inference at the personal level) and inference in the broad sense (inference at the sub-personal level), while the inferentialist tends to downplay it. To be sure, the inferentialist (e.g. Sperber) explicitly distinguishes between inferences in the ordinary sense and (possibly unconscious) inferences in the psychological sense. But (i) he suggests that the same type of process occurs in both cases, accompanied or unaccompanied by a state of conscious awareness; and (ii) by mislocating the distinction and phrasing it in terms of explicitness and voluntary control he neglects the crucial divide between cases in which the availability condition is satisfied (including spontaneous inference) and cases in which it is not (e.g. communicational or perceptual inference). That divide is, for the anti-inferentialist, fundamental. As Bezuidenhout notes (1998 : 268), Burge suggests that mental processes are justificatorily relevant sub-personal machinery underlying comprehension. To be sure, the mechanisms in question unambiguously belong to the mind-reading faculty, but their relation to that faculty must be properly understood. As Baron-Cohen pointed out, the mechanisms of intention-detection which play a role in normal comprehension (e.g. gaze tracking and the shared attention mechanism) are fundamental to the emergence of a full-fledged metarepresentational capacity of the sort that is exercised when we think about the mental states of others (Baron Cohen 1995: 30-58) . That complex capacity presupposes the primitive mechanisms of gaze-tracking and intention-detection -it builds upon them -but they do not, If we use the availability condition as the criterion for classifying inferences, we are bound to disagree with Sperber. Spontaneous inferences of the sort he describes satisfy the availability condition, while primary pragmatic inferences do not (section 6).
In this respect primary pragmatic inferences are exactly like the 'inferences' involved in perception : the anti-inferentialist viewpoint is therefore vindicated. But perhaps availability is not the right (or the only) criterion to use. Indeed Sperber and Wilson, who defend a variety of inferentialism, use a different criterion. They, too, distinguish inferences in the broad sense from a more restricted subclass, but the subclass they focus on is delimited not in terms of conscious availability, but in terms of their conceptual nature.
Marr uses 'inference' in a very broad sense. Nothing prevents the input to an inference in that sense (an M-inference, for short) from being nonconceptual.
Representations of intensity changes in terms of zero-crossings are clearly nonconceptual (Crane, 1990 ), yet Marr describes the transition from such proximal representations to distal representations of edges as an inference. Fodor (1983) uses 'inference' in the same broad way. But Sperber and Wilson use 'inference' much more restrictively. For there to be inference, they claim, the transition must be from a conceptual representation to a conceptual representation. Moroever, the transition must be truth-preserving. Only if these conditions are satisfied will a cognitive transition count as a genuine 'inference'. 'informationally encapsulated' (Fodor, 1983) . As Crane puts it,
The inferences a thinker is disposed to make (...) are constrained only by rationality, which allows the mind to range over its whole territory for its material. The resources of the visual system are, by contrast, severely restricted. Although we can treat it as deducing consequences from premises, the contents of these premises are not holistically related in the way the contents of beliefs are. (Crane, 1990: 156) In this respect, primary pragmatic inferences turn out to belong to the same realm as inferences in the narrow sense. They display the holistic properties that characterize operations of the central systems Sperber, 1986: 584-585, Bezuidenhout, 1998: 271-272) .
At this point, we might conclude that the inferentialist and the anti-inferentialist Admittedly, there are primary pragmatic processes which, unlike saturation, take fully conceptual material as input. Thus free enrichment maps a conceptual representation to another, more specific conceptual representation. The primary pragmatic process which I dubbed 'transfer' also maps conceptual representations to conceptual representations. But in all these cases it is dubious that the process is truthpreserving. To begin with, the process is local -it operates at the level of constituents rather than the level of complete, truth-evaluable representations (Recanati, 1993 (Recanati, , 1995 . Even if we disregard this feature and construe the process as a global mapping from propositional representations to propositional representations, still it is obviously not truth-preserving. In the case of transfer, the relation between input and output is associative rather than logical. In the case of free enrichment, there is a logical relation between the input and the output : the latter entails the former. This does not make free enrichment truth-preserving, however, because the entailment relation goes in the wrong direction.
The only way I can make sense of the claim that primary pragmatic processes are truth-preserving operations on conceptual representations is by moving to the metadiscursive level: there we find a transition (from the speaker utters sentence S to the speaker says that p) which is arguably truth-preserving. The input to that inference is a description of the speaker's utterance of a sentence possessing a certain meaning, and the output is a description of the speaker's locutionary act. The extra premisses used in the inference correspond to the contextual facts which have a bearing on the utterance's (Sperber and Wilson, 1987 : 737) .
I think exactly the same considerations apply to primary pragmatic processes: they are not themselves inferential (in the sense intended by Sperber and Wilson) , even if they can be embedded in a broader inferential process by moving to the meta-discursive level.
To sum up, it is not obvious that primary pragmatic processes operate on conceptual representations, and, when they do so, it is not obvious that they are truthpreserving. Still, I agree that they are cognitively penetrable and display the property of background-dependence -arguably the hallmark of conceptual processes. Perhaps this speaks in favour of the 'intermediate' level of inference posited by Sperber and Wilson. Be that as it may, I do not think this feature supports the inferentialist's claim that communication is inferential (at the relevant level) while perception is not.
As Oaksford and Chater (and many others) pointed out, knowledge-rich defeasible inference processes are 'implicated throughout almost every area of cognitive activity' (Oaksford and Chater, 1991: 10) . No less than communication, perception is a case in point. What we see (in the 'cognitive' sense, involving identification of the perceived object) is highly context-sensitive (Dretske, 1990 ).
Searle claims that the content of our perceptions holistically depends upon 'the background' just as the content of our utterances depends upon the background. 9 He gives the following example:
Suppose I am standing in front of a house looking at it; in so doing I will have a certain visual experience with a certain Intentional content, i.e. certain conditions of satisfaction; but suppose now as part of the background assumptions I assume I am on a Hollywood movie set and all of the buildings are just papier maché façades.
This assumption would not only give us different conditions of satisfaction; it would even alter the way the façade of the house looks to us, in the same way that the sentence 'Cut the grass!' would be interpreted differently if we thought that the background was such that we were supposed to slice the grass rather than mow it. (Searle, 1980: 231) It is part of the content of my visual experience when I look at a whole house that I expect the rest of the house to be there if, for example, I enter the house or go around to the back. In these sorts of cases the character of the visual experience and its conditions of satisfaction will be affected by the content of the beliefs that one has about the perceptual situation. I am not going beyond the content of my visual experience when I say, 'I see a house' instead of 'I see the façade of a house', for, though the optical stimuli may be the same, the conditions of satisfaction in the former case are that there should be a whole house there. (Searle, 1983: 54-55) This example shows how 'inferential' our perception can be. Of course, what I see does not result from an inference in the narrow sense, as when I infer John's presence from the perception of his car. It results from an inference in the broad sense -an inference that takes place at the sub-personal level. Yet that inference too displays the relevant feature of holistic background-dependence.
Another example. Following Sperber, I contrasted the perceptual belief that the doorbell is ringing with the inferential belief that there is someone at the door. Now the perceptual belief that the doorbell is ringing itself is 'inferential', since it involves identifying the sound as that of the doorbell ringing. The difference between the two beliefs is that one is inferential in the narrow sense, while the other is inferential in the
